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Democratic Theory and Indices of 

Democratization 

Michael Saward 

The indices of democratization can only be known within a full theory 
of democracy. In this chapter I will outline such a theory, focusing on 
definition and justification, the conditions of democracy, and what 
these conditions demand of democrats in terms of specific political 
practices and political institutions. 
Problems of definition 
Self-evidently, the properties of democracy can only be derived and 
listed after democracy has been defined adequately. What is the best 
way to go about this? 
First, and perhaps most familiarly, we can look at those countries 
commonly called democracies and define the concept according to 
certain features of those systems. 1 This approach, however, is subject 
to an equally familiar flaw. It is illogical to define democracy by 
induction from the practice of anyone political unit or anyone 
sub-set of political units (this has been called the definitional 
fallacy2). To take the same problem from a slightly different angle, 
we could argue with Ryan that 'it is no use defining democracy in 
terms of the politics of any particular country, for then we can no 
longer praise that country for being democratic - we cannot praise a 
society for qualities which belong to it by definition rather than by 
political contrivance' (1970: 29). An etymological route to definition 
serves us little better. The phrase 'rule by the people' is highly 
ambiguous and is open to highly diverse interpretations (Hadenius, 
1992; Held, 1987; Lively, 1975). 
A more promising route might be to define democracy according to 
certain basic principles. Beetham seeks to isolate 'the core ideas or 
principles embodied in the historical conception of democracy as 
"rule of the people'" (1993= 6). He takes these to be 'popular control' 
and 'political equality'. Hadenius adopts a similar approach and 
arrives at a conception of 'political democracy' which holds that 
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public policy 'is to be governed by the freely expressed will of the 
people whereby all individuals are to be treated as equals' 
(1992: 7-9). Lively (1975: 49-51) pinpoints the norms dictating 
inclusive citizenship and political equality, while Holden (1988: 6) 
boils democracy down to popular sovereignty. 
No doubt each of these core principles speaks directly to 'rule of 
the people'. Again, however, different writers isolate different (sets 
of) principles, even among our very limited sample. Should all three 
elements put forward - equality, sovereignty/control and inclu­
siveness - be regarded as core principles, or just one or two of them? 
As Sartori writes, 'there are hosts of characteristics or properties 
eligible for selection; not only majority rule and participation, but 
also equality, freedom, consensus, coercion, competition, pluralism, 
constitutional rule, and more' (1987: 184). 
So where do we go from here? I suggest that the alternatives are 
either to retreat into essential contestability (that is, to give Up)3 or to 
look for reasons that might justify adopting certain principles as 
basic. Of the four writers quoted above, only Beetham does so. He 
writes: 
The first principle [popular control] is underpinned by the value that we 
give to people as self-determining agents who should have a say on issues 
th"at effect their lives; the second [political equality] is underpinned by the 
assumption that everyone (or at least every adult) has an equal capacity 
for self-determination, and therefore an equal right to influence collective 
decisions, and to have their interests considered when they are made. 
(1993: 7) 
Even this effort begs a range of questions. Why does 'self­
determination' not require anarchy rather than democracy (or any 
other centrally organized political structure)? Why - on what basis ­
can we assume that people have an equal capacity for self­
determination? What version of people's interests is worthy of 
'consideration' - real, perceived, revealed, or some other? Is having 
'influence' and having one's interests 'considered' inconsistent with 
those interests being virtually ignored in substantive public policies? 
Although in the end this approach is also inadequate, it does 
provide hints as to how we might proceed. In essence, we need to 
justify more fulsomely our choice of principles. Defining democracy 
is a political act; the assumptions involved must be justified explicitly 
and convincingly to be of real value. What is needed is a definition of 
democracy which is not forged in theoretical isolation, but which is 
embedded in a theory which justifies and clarifies the concept of 
democracy as part of the process of definition. We should not posit a 
readily refutable, foundational equality as a core principle without an 
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argument about what it is about communities and people that makes 
such an assumption reasonab~e (or, more strongly, unavoidable). 
Justifying and defining democracy 
The most ready way to justify democracy is to start from an assertion 
that all people are equal in some important respect, since it follows 
from this that all should be treated equally in certain specific political 
respects. The most straightforward way to assert such a foundational 
equality is to say that, for example, we all have an equal capacity for 
self-determination, or for rationality, or for making life-plans. Once 
an acceptable principle of political equality is forged, it can be used 
to define and to justify democracy. Further, it can be used to facilitate 
the deduction of democracy's logically necessary conditions (and 
therefore the indices of democracy). This approach, for example, 
characterizes Dahl's efforts in Democracy and Its Critics (1989), 
where he posits what he calls the 'idea of intrinsic equality' as 
axiomatic. 
The critic of democracy has an equally ready reply, however, to 
foundational assertions of human equality. He or she can say: 
'People are not manifestly equal. It is clear that if they share in 
rationality, or a capacity for self-determination, then they share in it 
in complex and unequal ways. People differ in their tastes, their 
preferences, their outlooks, and the processes by which they form 
their beliefs.' 'Much better', the critic might argue, 'to ignore pious 
and unworldly talk of foundational equality and to build political 
practices and institutions on the manifest inequalities of human 
beings.' The chances of convincing many people living in societies 
where a certain structure of inequalities is widely accepted that 
democracy is the best form of government would be greatly 
diminished. 
Can a satisfactory justification of democracy be built on different­
one might say more sceptical- grounds?4 I believe that it can. The 
following account is necessarily brief, but I hope at least that it 
conveys the flavour of the argument. 
Claims that one person or minority group should rule a political 
community - that is, a group of individuals who need to make at least 
some binding collective decisions - without being democratically 
chosen can be based upon many foundations, notably sex, age, class, 
race, religion, military strength and knowledge (see Thorson, 
1962: 135).5 Most of these claims can be reduced to a common form of 
claim: thatDne person or group of people, by virtue of some specified 
characteristic, knows better the proper political course for a com­
munity than other people and groups. 6 If some such claim to superior 
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knowledge - whatever precise form it might take - is in principle 
acceptable, then democracy looks not to have a secure foundation. It 
is the strength of such claims to superior knowledge of political 
rightness that need to be examined: does any person or minority 
sub-group possess superior knowledge such that it can be said that 
they have a powerful claim to rule the rest in perpetuity? Initially, the 
question can be cast in the following form: are all claims to the 
requisite superior knowledge necessarily fallible? 
In philosophy, the claim of fallibilists is that we are never entitled 
to assume that our knowledge - whether moral or factual- is beyond 
doubt. As Thorson has put it, the principle of fallibilism 'does not say 
that we can never know the truth, but rather that we are never 
justified in behaving as if we know it ... we are never justified in 
refusing to consider the possibility that we might be wrong' 
(1962: 122). In John Stuart Mill's (1912) famous argument, fallibilism 
is valued for its social consequences, although his argument is rather 
more ambiguous on the question of whether our knowledge claims 
necessarily are in fact fallible. In Peirce's words, 'fallibilism is the 
doctrine that our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it 
were, in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy' 
(1940: 356).7 
On the face of it, fallibilism offers an attractive sceptical ground 
upon which to build a justification for an open-ended polity which 
thrives on freedom and criticism precisely because no one viewpoint 
is superior to others. However, the strength of the fallibilist argument 
applies only to a limited class of claims to superior knowledge, which 
I will call non-contingent superior knowledge. Non-contingent 
superior knowledge is knowledge which is not confined to anyone or 
any sub-set of a political community'S spheres of activity (such as 
health, education or energy).8 My argument is based on the fact that 
politics spans the community, is relevant to the whole community and 
the understandings and goods that are held to and made within it. 
Before defending the notion that there is in fact such a sphere of 
activity, and that the fallibilist principle defeats claims to non­
contingent superior knowledge within it, we need to consider how 
arguments that we ought to recognize contingent knowledge claims 
can overcome fallibilist objections. 
We commonly do recognize a variety of claims to superior 
knowledge, and with good reason. Most of these are in the realm of 
specialized, technical and therefore contingent knowledge: the 
garage mechanic knows better than I how to fix my car; the nuclear 
engineer knows better than I how to build a nuclear reprocessing 
plant; the social worker knows better than I how to deal with runaway 
teenagers. We can still be fallibilists and recognize a plurality of 
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claims to contingently superior knowledge - especially efficacious 
knowledge in certain contexts - since fallibilism is not a doctrine of 
equal knowledge, or of equarproximity to the truth. 
Of course, it is an old argument, going back to Plato at least, that 
knowledge of how political affairs ought to be conducted is not a type 
of knowledge qualitatively different from that required for a plethora 
of other technical or specialized tasks. This argument holds that the 
realm of politics is a realm of contingently superior knowledge: 
people with relevant specialized skills will always be better at it than 
others by virtue of their possession of those skills. If this is the case, 
then certain claims to superior knowledge in the realm of politics can 
escape the fallibilist critique. If the principle of fallibilism is to be 
usable as a justification for political equality - and thereafter of 
democracy - then we will need to establish that politics forms a 
sphere of activity where only non-contingent claims to superior 
knowledge obtain. This means establishing that politics is a distinc­
tively, qualitatively different sphere of activity to others within a 
defined community, and that claims to contingent superior know­
ledge in one or other sub-sphere of such a community cannot rightly 
be carried over into the sphere of politics. 
A key part of Michael Walzer's argument in Spheres of Justice 
(1983) is that we can recognize that certain groups of people can 
legitimately monopolize the control of certain social goods, mostly 
on the grounds that some social understandings of certain social 
goods include recognition of special skills or superior knowledge with 
respect to the particular character and the appropriate distribution of 
the good in question. However, for Walzer, political power denotes a 
sphere of social activity qualitatively different from other spheres. 
He writes that 
political power is a special sort of good. It has a twofold character. First, it 
is like other things that men and women make, value, exchange and share; 
sometimes dominant, sometimes not; sometimes widely held, sometimes 
the possession of the few. And, second, it is unlike all the other things 
because, however it is had and whoever has it, political power is the 
regulative agency for social goods generally. (1983: 15) 
This suggests that politics is a sphere of activity qualitatively different 
from others, because it is the 'regulative agency' for other spheres. 
Does this approach establish politics as a sphere of non-contingently 
superior knowledge? Ultimately, it fails to do so. We could argue, for 
example, that health and education are 'regulative' of other spheres 
of activity,. in that both involve conditions that can deeply constrain 
the capacity of anyone group or individual to prosper within other 
spheres (including politics). The 'regulation' involved may well be 
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informal (or cultural) rather than formal (or legal), but the argument 
still stands. 
Aside from the 'regulative' argument, however, there are three 
other arguments which go considerably further to establish politics as 
a qualitatively different sphere of activity. I shall call these the 
implication, cumulative and temporal arguments respectively. 
The implication argument suggests that politics is the only sphere 
of activity which is implicated in all other spheres within a political 
community. Whether it be the sphere of distribution of money, social 
status, education or health care, politics is involved.9 To show this, 
we need to take Walzer's argument a stage further than Walzer 
himself does, since he views political power as something that 'stops' 
at the boundaries of other spheres of activity. 
First, we can argue that insofar as the conception, creation and 
appropriate form of distribution of social goods is dependent upon 
social understandings, it is dependent upon social interests. Walzer 
recognizes that claims to monopolize social goods 'constitutes an 
ideology'. An ideology, in turn, is derived from a conception of 
interests. The idea that this or that recognized and distinct sphere of 
activity and understandings exists is itself the product of certain 
interests coming to the fore. Where interests are concerned, and 
therefore where the very constitution of spheres (and the precise 
nature of appropriate specialized knowledge within them) is con­
cerned, so is politics. The 'stuff of politics' - power, conflict and 
interests - does in fact go to the heart of any single sphere of activity, 
and does not (cannot) stop at the boundaries of semi-autonomous 
spheres of interest. 
In sum, on Walzer's logic (if not in his actual account) politics 
denotes a sphere of activity which is deeply, and inevitably, 
implicated in all others. It is not a sphere of contingent, specialized 
knowledge which is confined to a certain sub-communal domain. 
The cumulative argument suggests that the role of politics within 
all other spheres adds up to more than the sum of its parts. Consider, 
for example, an effort to understand the complexity of politics at a 
given time in what Dahl (1989) calls a 'modem dynamic pluralist' 
society. We could locate, and attempt to characterize, the nature of 
political battles within a number of separate spheres of activity. 
Assuming this can be done, we could then 'add' together these 
characterizations in an attempt to get an overall picture of the nature 
of political power within the community as a whole. But if we were 
able to do even this, our picture would be radically incomplete, 
because we would not yet have taken into account the politics 
involved in the boundary struggles betwe'en spheres in addition to the 
extra layer of political complexity involved in the interactions 
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between spheres. Politics is not 'just' about the nature of, and the 
different sorts of political claims within, different spheres of activity 
constituted around certain social goods; 11 is also about the multi­
faceted relationships between them. 
The temporal argument adds the effects of intra- and inter-sphere 
politics over time to the above points. The dimension of complexity 
of politics increases greatly over time as the sum total of relationships 
between and within spheres changes over time. Politics involves not 
just how spheres and their interactions differ at time t and time t + 1, 
but also information about the transition to the new state of affairs 
reached at t + 1. The need to understand the terms of this transition 
adds yet more to the complex - and qualitatively different - nature of 
political power. 
Overall, these arguments establish not just that politics is an 
activity which is qualitatively different in type from all others, but 
also that it is distinguished by massive differences of degree. My 
contention is that politics is not a realm where contingent claims to 
specialized, superior knowledge are legitimate; rather, it is a realm in 
which only non-contingent claims are admissible in principle. 1O 
However, since the principle of fallibilism renders inadmissible any 
such claims to non-contingently superior knowledge, all claims to 
superior knowledge with respect to politics must fail. 
There is implicit in this argument another argument about 
interests, which needs to be specified. Taking the points made above 
from a slightly different angle, we can concede (putting it briefly and 
formally) that a political authority (PA) could have legitimate 
contingently superior knowledge ofwhat is in the interests of a citizen 
(C) with regard to an issue (X). However, the sum of C's interests at a 
given time tconsist of judgements with respect to not only X, but also 
Xl, X2 •.. XN • It is highly dubious, given the above arguments, to 
think that PA's knowledge ofC's interests can extend to XN at t. Even 
if it could, it would have somehow to encompass the extra dimension 
involved in how, for example, C's interest in X might be affected by 
his interest in Xl and X2• Even granting her super-human knowledge 
up to this point, PA's job becomes tougher still at t + 1; at that point, 
PA would require, at a minimum, knowledge of C with respect to XN 
at t + 1 in addition to the original knowledge of C with respect to XN 
at t. Further, consider that the claim that PA can know the 'best 
interests' of citizens generally means that she would need to know the 
interests of CN at t, t + 1, t + 2, etc. The only reasonable conclusion 
that can be reached is that those in political authority cannot rightly 
claim to kpow the better interests of any citizen, or any group of 
citizens, beyond narrow considerations with respect to a narrow 
range of issues. Across the full range of a given citizen's relevant 
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concerns, individuals must be adjudged the best judges of their own 
interests in the absence of any alternative convincing argument. 11 
In conclusion, no one person can rightly claim to have sufficiently 
broad or perpetual superior knowledge of either (a) the rightful 
course for a political community, or (b) the totality of a given citizen's 
interests. Individuals and sub-groups must be taken to be the best 
judges of their own interests, not because of some inherent quality 
which they possess equally, but because of the absence of such a 
quality, or of our capacities to know such a quality. 
The equality assumption 
If the above arguments with respect to political authority are 
accepted, then it is imperative upon us to adopt - and to work with­
an assumption that all citizens are equal with respect to their right to 
decide the appropriate political course of their community. I shall 
refer to this as the 'equality assumption'. The need to adopt the 
equality assumption arises from the fact that there is no secure 
ground upon which it can be said that one person or group has better 
insight in this field than any other. Crucially, it involves the view that 
legitimate non-contingent claims to superior political knowledge are 
restricted to those made by democratically elected representatives 
during their period in office. 
The equality assumption is similar to arguments such as that we are 
equal in our capacity for self-determination or for rationality. It 
differs from these other conceptions, however, in that it is based on 
an absence (of certainty) rather than a presence (of some specified 
capacity or characteristic). 12 As such, it is easier to defend than other 
assertions of factual equality, since we do not need to argue that we 
all share a determinate characteristic in equal measure. 13 
Defining democracy (again) 
The equality assumption is to be the basis for the definition of 
democracy within the theory of democracy. The only general rule 
that can reasonably follow on from the equality assumption is that: 
substantive policy , and political and administrative actions per­
formed under substantive policy, must correspond to the express 
preferences of a majority of citizens. 
This rule can be reformulated by altering slightly the similar 
defining rule set out by May (1978): there should be necessary 
correspondence between acts of government and the equally 
weighted express wishes of citizens with "respect to those acts. On the 
basis of this definition of democracy - which May calls 'responsive 
... 
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rule', a locution that 1 adopt - we can construct a continuum. A 
political system is democratic to the extent that, and only to the 
extent that, it involves realization of responsive rule. 
Why does the equality assumption require us to focus on defining 
democracy in terms of appropriate outcomes (responsive rule) rather 
than procedures? Because we have no good reason not to opt for the 
strongest form in which self-judged interests filter into public policy. 
If the requirement were instead for responsive procedures, it would 
be by no means guaranteed that what citizens want is what they will 
get in terms of substance. Further, focusing on responsiveness with 
respect to substance involves implicitly the necessary establishment 
of decision procedures designed to secure such substance. Such 
procedures may take a variety of forms in different contexts, but their 
democratic character will be diminished insofar as they are not 
geared towards maximizing responsiveness. 
Why 'necessary correspondence' between acts of government and 
citizens' wishes? Because anything less than full correspondence 
suggests either (a) that values other than democracy are taking (at 
least partial) precedence over the realization of democratic decisions 
(I return to this later), and/or (b) that procedural inadequacies are 
affecting the democratic character of policy decisions. With an 
'absolute' definition of a separate principle - the principle of 
democracy - we can see more clearly areas in which democracy is 
traded off in favour of other values or principles, whether by choice 
or by necessity. 14 
What 'acts of government' are being referred to in the responsive 
rule definition? This term must cover administrative acts as well as 
more clearly political acts. It covers decisions and the structure and 
activity of institutions whose role it is to implement those decisions. It 
should be remembered that there is substance in procedures (Dahl, 
1989); the precise character and demands of a decision are still fluid 
to some degree once the decision is authoritatively taken. The realm 
of, for example, official discretion must therefore be brought into the 
purview of the responsive rule requirement. 
Is not an uncompromising responsive rule definition counter to 
empirical sense? Should not empirical realizability be allowed to 
qualify the definition and elucidation of democracy as a political 
concept (see, for instance, Hadenius, 1992)? Now, on one view, this 
seems eminently sensible: surely what is realizable should temper our 
would-be neutral definitions of concepts? It is, however, a far from 
sensible move, and can only create confusion. Once the floodgates 
are opened - once a writer's own views of how far (some version of) 
democracy IS actually realizable tempers his or her definition of the 
term - the task of definition becomes ridiculously subjective. 
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Arguments concerning empirical realizability depend in large part on 
the views of individual authors. Much better, I would argue, to define 
democracy more generally, and on more logical grounds, and then 
look later to arguments as to why it may not, or in a certain context 
cannot, be realized fully. Among other things, this is an argument for 
keeping democracy conceptually separate as a political value, which 
may need to be diluted in this or that practical context depending 
upon the range of constraints and opportunities which present 
themselves with regard to the organization of politics in that context. 
A couple of further comments are appropriate before we take the 
argument to its next step. I take it as axiomatic that simple majority 
rule is superior to any of its alternatives: qualified majority rule, 
minority rule or unanimous rule. I5 The responsive rule definition, in 
its as yet unexplored state, makes no acknowledgement of the widely 
agreed notion that majority rule on its own is inadequate - normally, 
it is understood that some form of limited majority rule is appropriate 
to democracy. The important thing for present purposes is that the 
distinctive nature and value of democratic rule - that it centres on 
responsiveness - needs to be understood in isolation to be fully 
appreciated. 
Finally, following the idea of responsive rule, it might be thought 
that direct rather than representative forms of decision-making are 
favoured, since the former will by definition almost always be more 
'responsive' than the latter. This is true (Saward, 1993). The theory­
as set out so far, at least - leans heavily towards direct mechanisms 
rather than indirect mechanisms, insofar as the former are more 
likely to maximize responsive rule than the latter. 16 This is also a part 
of regarding democracy as an independent value. 
The logic of self-limiting democracy 
Responsive rule does not mean unlimited rule, or 'tyranny of the 
majority'. The basic argument against such a position follows 
logically and directly from the equality assumption and the respon­
sive rule definition: if (a) responsive rule should operate in political 
communities so far as this is feasible, and (b) responsive rule may be 
overthrown in a simple majority rule system, then (c) factors logically 
necessary to responsive rule's persistence should be taken out of the 
reach of majority decision procedures. 17 
So responsive rule must be subject to certain conditions. These 
conditions arise from the internal logic of democracy, and not from 
limiting values separate from democracy. It follows from these points 
that there is no justification within the theory for the majority 
viewpoint not being decisive in terms of substantive policy in cases 
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other than those which threaten the persistence of responsive rule 
itself. 
The logically necessary conditions of democracy 
Responsive rule does not come easily. Various conditions must be 
met before we can say that it is effectively in place. My argument 
concentrates on what are logically necessary conditions, rather than 
on empirically necessary conditions (though these two categories no 
doubt overlap at various points). The conditions largely refer to 
rights, freedoms and decision mechanisms. Each follows deductively 
from the equality assumption and the responsive rule definition. The 
basic freedoms reflect the requirements flowing from the equality 
assumption. Citizenship and participation conditions reflect the need 
for minimal rights and specified mechanisms essential to the maxi­
mization of responsive rule. The publicity condition is a key 
background condition making responsive rule possible and helping 
citizens to develop informed interests. Social rights are included for 
similar reasons (I shall say more about them below). If the general 
argument holds, then these minimal conditions taken together form 
the indices of democratization. 
(A) 	Basic freedoms 
1 Each citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression. 
2 Each citizen has the right to freedom of movement. 
3 Each citizen has the right to freedom of association. 
4 Each citizen has the right to equal treatment under the law. 
5 Each citizen has the right to freedom of worship. 
(B) 	Citizenship and participation 
6 The political community must have a common and standardized 
form of legal membership compatible with the basic freedoms. 
7 Citizens have an equal right to run for elective office. 
8 Citizens have the right to be equally eligible to serve, and, where 
appropriate, granted an equal probability of being selected for 
service, in non-elective representative and decisional bodies. 
9 Citizens have the equal right to vote in all elections and 
referendums. 
10 Citizens' votes must be decisive under all decision mechanisms. 
11 Mechanisms must be available for citizens to vote directly on 
substantive outcomes. If elected officials deem a decision in­
appropJjate for direct decision, the burden of demonstrating the 
grounds of such inappropriateness lies with those officials. 
12 There must be a voting system (such as two-stage contests) which 
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allows for the expression of a majority preference in multi-sided 
contests. 
13 Where votes for representatives are conducted, these votes must 
be renewed at regular and specified intervals. 
14 	Regular opinion polls must be conducted by an appropriate 
agency on all issues of substantive importance, whether or not 
these issues are to be decided by representative decision. The 
burden of demonstrating the appropriateness of not following 
citizen preferences on a given issue lies with elected representa­
tives. 
15 	There must be a presumption that all issues will be decided by 
referendums, and clear guidelines as to when a referendum may 
be forgone. 
16 	All issues not specifically prohibited from majority decision must 
be open to majority decision via one of the appropriate mechan­
Isms. 
(C) Administrative codes 
17 There must be appropriate codes of procedure for employees in 
public bodies. 
18 There must be regularly produced evidence that public decisions 
are being put into effect. 
19 There must be appropriate time limits placed on the realization of 
the substance of public decisions. 
20 There must be instituted adequate appeals and redress mechan­
isms with respect to public bodies and their functions. 
21 	There must be freedom of information from all government 
bodies. The burden of proof of demonstrating the inappro­
priateness of full freedom of information in specific cases lies with 
the elected representatives. 
(D) Publicity 
22 	There must be a constant and formal process of public notification 
of decisions, options, arguments, issues and outcomes. 
(E) Social rights 

23 Every citizen has the right to adequate health care. 

24 Every citizen has the right to an adequate education. 

Following the logic of the general theory, in principle each of these 
rights or freedoms must be guaranteed to each citizen in spite of the 
will of a majority or minority of citizens, and must be protected by a 
judicial system which is not itself a part of majoritarian decision 
processes. In other words, each should be constitutionalized. 
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Some further comments are needed in order to justify the style and 
content of the above list. One general concern is that there are 
various arguments and suggestions to the effect that restrictions on 
majoritarianism are undemocratic. In particular, many worry about 
putting power in the hands of unelected judges, whose task it is to 
interpret constitutional requirements in a democracy. According to 
Dworkin this is the reason why 'judicial review [in the United States] 
is generally regarded as undemocratic, even by its sometime friends, 
and even by its passionate admirers' (1987: 28-9). Pennock likewise 
notes that the Supreme Court is 'an institution that is often said to be 
undemocratic' (1989: 30). Discussions of constitutionalism and 
democracy regularly start from the highly questionable - and 
normally undefended - assumption that there is an essential tension 
between the two (see Brennan and Lomasky, 1989: 2; Elster, 
1988: 7). Clearly, not all restrictions on majority decision can be 
democratic; indeed, as I have suggested, those restrictions that are 
acceptable because logical (deducible) are quite specific and few in 
number. It is not 'precommitment' that must be endorsed, but 
democratic precommitments (see Holmes, 1988). Holmes argues 
rightly that to 'grant power to all future majorities ... a constitution 
must limit the power of any given majority' (1988: 226). His 
argument, though, stresses the good, 'enabling' consequences of 
certain precommitments, whereas it is more important to stress the 
fundamental nature of democratic precommitment. As Sunstein 
writes: 
Rights provisions are designed to fence off certain areas from majori­
tarian control, but they also serve different functions. The protection of 
some rights is rooted in a desire to protect democracy, however 
understood. The right to freedom of speech and the right to vote are 
examples. The fact that majorities cannot intrude on such rights should 
not obscure their democratic nature. But rights might also be antide­
mocratic, in the sense that they interfere with democratic processes for 
reasons that are independent of a desire to preserve the functioning of 
democracy. (1988:328) 
Social rights 
There are various objections to constitutionalizing - and therefore 
making into rights - any social (or economic) conditions. The first is 
that constitutions are about negative liberties (like freedom of speech 
and association), not positive liberties (like the right to a decent 
education). Kymlicka and Norman write that many constitutional 
experts 'w.orry that it would be a radical and potentially dangerous 
new step to let judges determine the government's positive obli­
gations' (1992:'2). Note, however, that this objection depends upon a 
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rather weak characterization of different rights. For example, a right 
to an adequate education can be construed as a negative right: the 
state does not have the right to deprive you of an adequate education. 
Construing 'civil' and 'political' rights as negative and 'social' rights 
as positive is optional, a matter of rhetoric rather than substance. 
A second objection is that these provisions would place too many 
cash burdens on governments with few resources at their disposal. 
That this may be the case does not mean that these social rights 
should not be constitutionalized according to the logic of democracy. 
If a government genuinely cannot afford to deliver on these social 
rights, then it may well be the case that acceptable discounting rules 
can be used when the theory of democracy is applied to political 
practice. 
A third objection is that constitutionalizing some social rights 
politicizes the judiciary. If so, so be it; it is a mistake, as noted above, 
to assume that the role of the judiciary is always to act as a brake on 
democracy. My argument is the 'interdependence' argument: as set 
out by Kymlicka and Norman, referring to Marshall's notion of the 
historical extension of rights from the civil to the political to the 
social, 
[w]hile this process can be seen as adding new rights, it can be seen as 
extending the earlier rights. Just as political rights are now seen as a way of 
guaranteeing civil rights, so social rights can be seen as providing the 
conditions for effective exercise of both civil and po1itical rights. 
(1992: 11)18 
Finally, it might be objected that the interdependence argument 
opens the floodgates to the constitutionalization of a much more 
extensive range of social (and other) rights. I have confined the social 
rights specified here to health and education requirements, since 
these are distinctively related to a citizen's capacity to exercise his or 
her other basic righ ts. I would concede, however, that no clear cu t -off 
point can be specified in a thoroughly non-arbitrary manner. This 
concession involves accepting that as we approach the (impossible) 
point of 'full democracy', we enter a grey area. If a full range of 
demanding social and economic (and perhaps ecological) rights were 
to be constitutionalized, little would be left for 'ordinary' democratic 
decision. We can hypothesize that even if a full democracy were 
possible, it would not be desirable, since in a sense it would 
undermine itself. 19 
Democracy and competing values 
A democracy - or a partial democracy - always exists somewhere, 
within some unique set of background conditions. In a huge variety of 
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ways, those background conditions can and will constrain the extent 
and the character of the democratic regime achieved. 
In this context we need-to consider a range of values, or political 
principles, that we can expect in theory (and which, in some cases, 
we know in practice) to operate at variance with the democratic 
principle. Arguably, the key ones to consider in a full analysis are: 
(a) political stability, (b) justice, (c) nationalism, (d) the environ­
mental imperative and (e) efficiency. 
Is there a satisfactory trade-off principle to guide us when we are 
faced with conflicting principled demands? There is no such obvious 
principle. Consistency is one possibility (Barry, 1965), but it is quite 
conceivable that to be consistent may be to be consistently wrong. 
Another alternative is to derive trade-off rules according to the 
canons of a higher principle to which the two competing, and sub­
ordinate, principles bear some logical or moral relation (Goodin 
and Wilenski, 1984). In the case of democracy, however - at least as 
I have presented it -- it is not at all clear that this approach might 
help us. Democracy is here conceived as a value in itself. Perhaps 
insofar as other values, linked perhaps to justice, may derive di­
rectly from the equality assumption, then equality could be the 
higher principle upon which trade-offs can be conducted. 
It might be argued, of course, that the key notions contained 
within the theory of democracy itself -- such as the best-judge prin­
ciple, suitably interpreted - could be used to suggest procedures by 
which trade-offs ought to be conducted. This approach is attractive 
for those who feel that democracy - or at least a democratic pro­
cedure -- represents a higher principle than all others. That claim is 
not a part of the argument I am presenting. Ultimately, I do not 
think that any secure conclusions about value trade-offs can be 
reached within democratic theory. If they can be reached at all, it 
will be between the democratic principle and other, competing, 
principles. 
Just as full constitutionalization of an extensive range of social 
and other rights -- beyond what I have suggested above -- may not 
always be desirable, so between democracy and other competing 
values there is no necessary prescription that democracy must 'win' 
when principles conflict. 20 Ever more democracy is not necessarily a 
good thing. We will want some stability as well at times, for example 
(assuming for the moment that the two might clash). Rarely, how­
ever, is this said explicitly. Ought we really to be frightened to sug­
gest that we would ever want to be anything other than wholly 
democratic in our political logic and our political actions? Ifwe are 
to gain a clear view of democracy - if we are to isolate its character 
and its value for us, separately from other considerations - then we 
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must view in a clearheaded way how it will often be diluted in the 
desire to see realized certain other key political principles.21 
Conclusion 
This chapter has covered a great deal of ground in a limited space, 
leaving many key assumptions undefended. I hope at least to have 
said enough to convince readers that the principles upon which the 
indices of democracy are based require careful justification and 
elucidation. Quite specific indices of democracy can follow deduc­
tively from abstract arguments about definition and justification. 
None of us deserves privilege in the realm of politics. Responsive­
ness and equality are - or at least, should be -- the keys to political 
legitimacy. Once we have teased out what democracy is, and what it 
demands of citizens and governors, we can begin to understand 
clearly the magnitude of the task facing democratizers around the 
globe. Perhaps, in a small way, we will even be contributing to their 
efforts. 
Notes 
In addition to participants in the ECPR workshop on 'Indices of Democratization' , the 
author would like to thank the members of the University College London Political 
Philosophy Group and those attending the London School of Economics Graduate 
Seminar in Political Philosophy for their many helpful comments and criticisms. 
1 For variants on this approach, see, e.g., Lijphart (1984: 2) and Schumpeter 
(1952: 269). 
2 See Holden (1974: 6) for a discussion ofthis idea. 
3 For a discussion of essential contestability in this context, see Arblaster 
(1987: 5-8). 
4 A broadly sceptical justification does not mean a 'postmodem' justification (see 
Saward, 1994). 
5 See Levin (1992) for the ways in which these and other comparable claims have 
proved powerful in the development of the American, British, French and German 
political systems. 
6 This fits closely with Walzer's view: 'All arguments for exclusive rule, all 
anti-democratic arguments, ifthey are serious, are arguments from special knowledge' 
(1983: 285). 
7 Fallibilism is now standard in the philosophy of science - Laudan comments that 
'we are all fallibilists now' (1990: 133). Popper expresses it thus: 
:The status of truth in the objective sense, as correspondence to the facts, and its role 
as a regulative principle, may be compared tc? that of a mountain peak which is 
permanently, or almost permanently, wrapped in clouds. The climber may not 
merely have difficulties in getting there - he may not know when he gets there, 
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because he may be unable to distinguish, in the clouds, between the summit and 
some subsidiary peak. (1983: 185--6) 
Friendly critics of Popper are If anything more fully fallibilist than Popper himself. 
Lakatos, for example, writes: 'The demarcation line between the soft, unproven 
"theories" and the hard, proven "empirical basis" is non-existent: all propositions of 
science are theoretical and, incurably, fallible' (1980: 16). 
8 I borrow the use of the term 'spheres' from Walzer, who uses it to distinguish 
processes of interaction which take place around different social goods within a 
community. 
9 This involves adopting a broad definition of politics. If politics is about power, 
and power is a ubiquitous phenomenon (see Foucault, 1980), then medicine, health 
and education, for example, are political. Feminist writers have done the most in 
recent years to foster broader definitions of politics (see Pateman, 1987). 
10 Itmight be objected that the very complexity considered here makes the need for 
contingent, specialized knowledge in politics so much the greater. But as Dryzek 
(1990) argues, the process of 'mapping' this complexity is a task that is thoroughly 
subjective, and ultimately is not amenable to any specialized form of systems planning 
alone. The only type of political system which could conceivably allow for contingent, 
superior knowledge in the broader realm of political decision-making would be a 
highly decentralized system of functional representation and autonomy. rdo not know 
of such a system historically, and cannot see how it could be reconciled with the 
territorial basis of political authority. 
11 For a full discussion of the 'best-judge principle', see Goodin (1990). 
12 This may seem an unduly 'negative' route to take in the search for a justification 
of democracy. Citizens, it seems, are being stripped of the glossy dignity that universal 
assertions of autonomy or capacities for rationality normally grant to them. This 
objection, however, does not hold. For one thing, the equality assumption does not 
lack prescriptive strength because of the style of its derivation; weaknesses must be 
sought in the argument, not in the presumed character of the argument. Further, as 
Barber (1984) has elegantly shown, sceptical arguments for democracy can take on a 
highly positive tone by stressing the liberating nature of overturning rarely questioned 
theoretical myths. 
13 Some writers reach a similar point but proceed to assert a foundational equality, 
or assume that it is enough that many people believe that we are equal in some 
important respect. See, e.g., the arguments of Botwinick (1985) and Dahl (1989). 
14 This more rigorous definition should help to add value to the concept of 
democracy as a tool for comparative analysis. 
15 See the accounts of majority rule in Dahl (1989), Lively (1975), McLean (1987) 
and Spitz (1984). 
16 Mechanisms of direct democracy - most obviously the referendum - do not 
necessarily require smaller political units (Saward, 1993). A key task of democratic 
theory is to ascertain whether a given political unit is democratically governed, and not 
to question the 'givenness' of the unit itself. 
17 See the discussion of self-binding in Elster (1988). 
18 Cf. Rawls' arguments on the 'fair value of liberty' (1972: 204, 225--6). 
19 Compare with Williams' comment that consistently applying the principle of 
equality of opportunity might lead to 'a quite inhuman society' (1962: 130-1). 
20 This approach to democratic theory forms a compromise between broadly 
universalist and particularist views (see Parekh, 1993, for an extended discussion). 
Democracy does, as I have argued, involve certain unavoidable commitments for 
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those who espouse it. However the values that might be used to modify or dilute the 
degree of democracy realized in a given political unit (e.g. a nation-state) might vary 
widely from one place to another, and the democrat must grant to such values a 
sceptical but healthy respect. 
21 It is worth noting that, in general terms, considerable dilution of the democratic 
ideal, as presented here, would still leave us with a political system infinitely more 
democratic than, for example, the contemporary British state. 
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